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That’s enough about 
ethnography!
Tim Ingold, University of Aberdeen
Ethnography has become a term so overused, both in anthropology and in contingent 
disciplines, that it has lost much of its meaning. I argue that to attribute “ethnographicness” 
to encounters with those among whom we carry on our research, or more generally to 
fieldwork, is to undermine both the ontological commitment and the educational purpose 
of anthropology as a discipline, and of its principal way of working—namely participant 
observation. It is also to reproduce a pernicious distinction between those with whom we 
study and learn, respectively within and beyond the academy. Anthropology’s obsession 
with ethnography, more than anything else, is curtailing its public voice. The way to regain 
it is through reasserting the value of anthropology as a forward-moving discipline dedicated 
to healing the rupture between imagination and real life.
Keywords: correspondence, education, ethnography, fieldwork, method, participant 
observation, theory 
Explaining what we mean 
“Ethnographic” has become the most overused term in the discipline of anthro-
pology. It is hard to say exactly when the term broke loose from its moorings, 
or what the reasons were for its subsequent proliferation. These reasons are un-
doubtedly complex and could be the subject for a separate historical study. my 
concern in this article, however, is prospective, not retrospective. For I believe 
that this overuse is doing great harm to anthropology, that it is holding it back 
while other fields of study are surging forward, and that it is actually preventing 
our discipline from having the kind of impact in the world that it deserves and 
that the world so desperately needs. And because the cause is desperate, I shall not 
refrain from polemic. The tenor of what follows is partisan, and deliberately so. I 
am sick and tired of equivocation, of scholarly obscurantism, and of the conceit 
that turns the project of anthropology into the study of its own ways of working. 
A discipline confined to the theatre of its own operations has nowhere to go. In 
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its spiraling descent into irrelevance, it has no-one and nothing to blame other 
than itself. 
my aim is not to eliminate ethnography, or to expunge it from our anthropolog-
ical consciousness. Nor is it to underrate its significance, and the complex demands 
it places on those who practice it. rather, I am concerned to narrow ethnography 
down so that to those who ask us, in good faith, what it means, we can respond with 
precision and conviction. Only by doing so, I contend, can we protect it from the 
inflation that is otherwise threatening to devalue its currency to the extent of ren-
dering the entire enterprise worthless. For it is not only within anthropology that 
ethnography is on the loose. I am sure I speak for the majority of anthropological 
colleagues in deploring the abuse of the term that has become commonplace in so-
cial sciences beyond our shores. How many research proposals have we read, com-
ing from such fields as sociology, social policy, social psychology and education, in 
which the applicant explains that he or she will conduct “ethnographic interviews” 
with a sample of randomly selected informants, the data from which will then be 
processed by means of a recommended software package in order to yield “results”? 
Such a procedure, in which ethnographic appears to be a modish substitute for 
qualitative, offends every principle of proper, rigorous anthropological inquiry—
including long-term and open-ended commitment, generous attentiveness, re-
lational depth, and sensitivity to context—and we are right to protest against it. 
And, we are equally entitled to protest when those who assess our own proposals 
demand of us, in the name of ethnography, the same slavish adherence to the pro-
tocols of positivist methodology, by requiring us to specify—for example—how 
many people we intend to talk to, for how long, and how they will be selected. 
Against such benchmarks, anthropological research is bound to be devalued. 
Our protests, however, will be of no avail unless we can explain what we mean 
by ethnography in terms that are cogent and intellectually defensible. It is not 
enough to for us to say that anthropological research is ethnographic because that 
is what we anthropologists do. To wear ethnography as a badge of honor is unlikely 
to impress anyone beyond our own charmed circle. At a time when so many of us 
feel that our discipline is under threat, pushed to the margins where it no longer 
enjoys the public voice it once had, the growing inability to explain what we really 
mean by ethnography is an increasing source of embarrassment—all the more so 
when, as a defensive reaction, we continue to fall back on ethnography as the one 
thing that marks anthropology out, and justifies its existence as a discipline with 
something distinctive to contribute. To stake our fortunes in such shifting sands is 
a risky strategy indeed!
What ethnography is
Consider just some of the terms to which the qualifier “ethnographic” is routine-
ly applied: there is the ethnographic encounter, ethnographic fieldwork, ethno-
graphic method, ethnographic knowledge. There are ethnographic monographs, 
and ethnographic films. And now we have ethnographic theory! Through all these 
runs the ethnographer. Taking this as a primary dimension of identity, it would 
appear that everything the ethnographer turns his or her hand to is, prima facie, 
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ethnographic. Suppose you reflect and write only on your own experience? Well, if 
you are an ethnographer, then that’s autoethnography. Suppose that your job is to 
curate artefacts in a museum, collected from different parts of the world, then that’s 
museum ethnography. Curiously, however, the term does not extend to what goes 
on within the confines of the academy. As students, we are not said to undertake 
ethnography when we train with more senior scholars. Nor to my knowledge do 
any of my anthropological colleagues, when they work with students, claim to be 
practicing ethnography in the classroom. In the settings of seminars, workshops 
and conferences, academic anthropologists talk a great deal about ethnography, 
but rarely if ever do they claim to be doing it. The ethnography, it seems, is always 
going on somewhere else. 
I shall return to these anomalies in due course. First, let me declare my hand by 
stating what ethnography means. Quite literally, it means writing about the people. 
Though we anthropologists would likely not turn to the dictionary for an authorita-
tive definition, others well might, and this is what they would find: “a scientific de-
scription of races and peoples with their customs, habits and mutual differences.”1 
To us, of course, this sounds hopelessly anachronistic. We would move at once to 
remove all reference to race. We would insist that there is far more to description 
than the mere cataloging of habits and customs. In thickening our descriptions, 
and allowing a real historical agency to the people who figure in them, we might 
want to qualify the sense in which these accounts could be considered to be scien-
tific. Ethnographic description, we might well say, is more an art than a science, but 
no less accurate or truthful for that. Like the Dutch painters of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the European and American ethnographers of the twentieth could be said to 
have practiced an “art of describing” (Alpers 1983), albeit predominantly in words 
rather than in line and color. Theirs is still a standard against which we measure 
contemporary work.
These issues have been debated ad nauseam. much of this debate has fallen 
under the rubric of the so-called “crisis of representation.” Quite reasonably, con-
troversial questions have been asked about who has the right to describe, on what 
grounds any description may be taken to be more truthful or authoritative than 
any other, to what extent the presence of the author can or should be acknowl-
edged within the text, and how the whole process of writing it might be made more 
collaborative. I do not intend to prolong these controversies. my focus is rather 
on what is not ethnographic. While a written monograph, in so far as it aims to 
chronicle the life and times of a people, may justifiably be called ethnographic, 
and while the same may even be said of a film that shares the same objectives, I 
do not believe the term can be applied to our encounters with people, to the field-
work in which these encounters take place, to the methods by which we prosecute 
it, or to the knowledge that grows therefrom. Indeed to characterize encounters, 
fieldwork, methods and knowledge as ethnographic is positively misleading. Auto-
ethnography, when there are no people to describe but only the self, and museum 
ethnography, where there are only curated objects, are simply oxymoronic. As for 
ethnographic theory, my argument will be that this is to get anthropology precisely 
back to front.
1. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th ed., s. v. “ethnography.”
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Encountering the world
Let me begin with ethnographic encounters. Simply put: in the conduct of our re-
search, we meet people. We talk with them, we ask them questions, we listen to 
their stories and we watch what they do. In so far as we are deemed competent and 
capable, we join in. There is nothing particularly special or unusual about this: it 
is, after all, what people do all the time when they encounter one another. What, 
then, could possibly distinguish an encounter that is ethnographic from one that 
is not? Here you are in what you imagine to be the field (of which more below). 
You tell people that you have come to learn from them. You are perhaps hoping 
that they will teach you some of their practical skills, or that they will explain what 
they think about things. You try very hard to remember what you have observed, 
or what people have told you, and lest you forget, you write it all down in fieldnotes 
as soon as the opportunity arises. Could it be the eagerness to learn, the strenuous 
memory-work, or perhaps the subsequent writing of notes, that lends an ethno-
graphic inflection to your encounters with others? 
The answer is no. For what we could call “ethnographicness” is not intrinsic to 
the encounters themselves; it is rather a judgment that is cast upon them through a 
retrospective conversion of the learning, remembering and note-taking which they 
call forth into pretexts for something else altogether. This ulterior purpose, con-
cealed from the people whom you covertly register as informants, is documentary. 
It is this that turns your experience, your memory and your notes into material—
sometimes spun quasi-scientifically as “data”—upon which you subsequently hope 
to draw in the project of offering an account. The risks of double-crossing entailed 
in this ethnographizing of encounters, and the ethical dilemmas consequent upon 
them, are well known and much discussed. No one could accuse anthropologists 
of turning a blind eye to them. This is not where the fault lies. It lies rather in a 
temporal distortion that contrives to render the aftermath of our meetings with 
people as their anterior condition. Johannes Fabian (1983: 37), alluding to the same 
distortion, speaks of the “schizochronic tendencies of emerging anthropology.” In 
effect, to cast encounters as ethnographic is to consign the incipient—the about-
to-happen in unfolding relationships—to the temporal past of the already over. It is 
as though, on meeting others face-to-face, one’s back was already turned to them. 
This is to leave behind those who, in the moment of encounter, stand before. Two-
faced indeed! 
Over a period of time, encounters with people are compounded and folded into 
what we have come to know as fieldwork. Thus the objections I have raised to the 
ethnographizing of the former apply to the latter as well. Ethnographicness is no 
more intrinsic to fieldwork than it is to the encounters of which it is comprised. 
The conflation of ethnography with fieldwork is indeed one of the most common-
place in the discipline, and all the more insidious because it is so rarely questioned. 
That the field is never experienced as such when you are actually there and caught 
up in the currents of everyday life—that it only stands out when you have left it far 
behind and begin to write about it—is widely acknowledged. What we have been 
less ready to accept is that the same goes for the ethnographic. Perhaps then, if we 
are to be really consistent, we should drop both the ethnographic and the field from 
ethnographic fieldwork, and refer instead to our tried and tested way of working, 
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namely participant observation. Ethnography and participant observation, as Jenny 
Hockey and martin Forsey (2012) have pointed out, are absolutely not the same.
Observing from the inside
To observe means to watch what is going on around and about, and of course to 
listen and feel as well. To participate means to do so from within the current of 
activity in which you carry on a life alongside and together with the persons and 
things that capture your attention. As with the encounter, anthropological partici-
pant observation differs only in degree from what all people do all of the time, 
though children more than most. But children have all their lives to learn. For the 
adult anthropologist, arriving as a complete newcomer and with limited time at his 
or her disposal, the hurdles are considerably greater. Now as a way of working—or 
better perhaps, as a condensed expression of the way we all work—participant ob-
servation is a procedure that I wholeheartedly endorse. But, I am not so sure that 
we have the full measure of why it is so important and so essential to what we do. In 
this regard, I want to make two points about it. The first is about ontological com-
mitment; the second—to which I move in the next section—is about education.
It is sometimes supposed that participation and observation are in contradic-
tion. How can one simultaneously watch what is going on and join in? Is this not 
tantamount to asking us to swim in the river and stand on the bank at the same 
time? “One can observe and participate,” writes michael Jackson (1989: 51), “suc-
cessively but not simultaneously.” Observation and participation, he goes on, yield 
different kinds of data, respectively objective and subjective. So how can the en-
gagement of participation possibly be combined with the detachment of obser-
vation? These questions, however, are founded upon a certain understanding of 
immanence and transcendence, deeply rooted in the protocols of normal science, 
according to which human existence is constitutionally split between being in the 
world and knowing about it. The alleged contradiction between participation and 
observation is no more than a corollary of this split. As human beings, it seems, we 
can aspire to truth about the world only by way of an emancipation that takes us 
from it and leaves us strangers to ourselves (Ingold 2013: 5).
Anthropology, surely, cannot passively acquiesce to this excision of knowing 
from being. more than any other discipline in the human sciences, it has the means 
and the determination to show how knowledge grows from the crucible of lives 
lived with others. This knowledge, as we are well aware, consists not in proposi-
tions about the world but in the skills of perception and capacities of judgment 
that develop in the course of direct, practical, and sensuous engagements with our 
surroundings. This is to refute, once and for all, the commonplace fallacy that ob-
servation is a practice exclusively dedicated to the objectification of the beings and 
things that command our attention and their removal from the sphere of our sen-
tient involvement with consociates. recall Jackson (1989: 51): observation, he says, 
yields “objective data.” Nothing could be further from the truth. For to observe is 
not to objectify; it is to attend to persons and things, to learn from them, and to 
follow in precept and practice. Indeed there can be no observation without partici-
pation—that is, without an intimate coupling, in perception and action, of observer 
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and observed (Ingold 2000: 108). Thus, participant observation is absolutely not an 
undercover technique for gathering intelligence on people, on the pretext of learn-
ing from them. It is rather a fulfilment, in both letter and deed, of what we owe to 
the world for our development and formation. That is what I mean by ontological 
commitment.
An education by attention
But to practice participant observation is also to undergo an education. Indeed I 
believe there are good grounds for substituting the word “education” for “ethno-
graphy” as the most fundamental purpose of anthropology. I do not mean to give 
a boost to that minor and unjustly neglected subfield known as the anthropology 
of education. I want to insist, rather, on anthropology as a practice of education. 
That is to say, it is a practice dedicated to what Kenelm Burridge (1975: 10) has 
called metanoia: “an ongoing series of transformations each one of which alters 
the predicates of being.” Though Burridge argues that metanoia is the goal of eth-
nography, to my mind it much more appropriately describes the goal of education. 
Jackson (2013: 28), who fully concurs with Burridge in the way he thinks about his 
own research, much of it carried out among Kuranko people in Sierra Leone, ac-
knowledges that “Sierra Leone transformed me, shaping the person I now am and 
the anthropology I do.” Exactly so: but that is why the anthropology he does is a 
practice of education and not of ethnography. “I have never thought of my research 
among the Kuranko as elucidating a unique lifeworld or foreign worldview,” he 
admits. “rather, this was the laboratory in which I happened to explore the human 
condition” (ibid.). 
With his Kuranko mentors, Jackson studies the conditions and possibilities of 
being human. That, precisely, is to do anthropology. But by the same token, since 
he is not setting out to elucidate the Kuranko lifeworld, it is not ethnography. And 
yet, despite this, Jackson continues to portray himself as an ethnographer! Else-
where, however, he comes close to defining his anthropological project in educa-
tional terms: it is, he says, about “opening up new possibilities for thinking about 
experience” (ibid.: 88)—a process which, following the philosopher richard rorty, 
he calls edification. For rorty, to edify is to keep the conversation going and, by 
the same token, to resist all claims to final, objective truth. It is to open a space, he 
writes, “for the sense of wonder which poets can sometimes cause—wonder that 
there is something new under the sun, something which is not an accurate repre-
sentation of what was already there, something which (at least for the moment) 
cannot be explained and can barely be described” (rorty 1980: 370). 
Does this sense of wonder, which rorty attributes to the poet, not also lie at 
the root of anthropological sensibility? Like poetry, anthropology is a quest for 
education in the original sense of the term, far removed from the sense it has sub-
sequently acquired through its assimilation to the institution of the school. Derived 
from the Latin educere (from ex, “out,” plus ducere, “to lead”), education was a mat-
ter of leading novices out into the world rather than, as commonly understood 
today, of instilling knowledge in to their minds. Instead of placing us in a position 
or affording a perspective, education in this sense is about pulling us away from 
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any standpoint—from any position or perspective we might adopt. In short, as the 
philosopher of education Jan masschelein (2010a: 278) has observed, it is a practice 
of exposure. 
Surely participant observation, if nothing else, is just such a practice. It is one 
that calls upon the novice anthropologist to attend: to attend to what others are 
doing or saying and to what is going on around and about; to follow along where 
others go and to do their bidding, whatever this might entail and wherever it might 
take you. This can be unnerving, and entail considerable existential risk. It is like 
pushing the boat out into an as yet unformed world—a world in which things are 
not ready made but always incipient, on the cusp of continual emergence. Com-
manded not by the given but by what is on the way to being given, one has to be 
prepared to wait (masschelein 2010b: 46). Indeed, waiting upon things is precisely 
what it means to attend to them. 
On intersubjectivity and correspondence
As every anthropologist knows, there is a great deal of waiting in participant ob-
servation. Launched in the current of real time, participant observation couples 
the forward movement of one’s own perception and action with the movements of 
others, much as melodic lines are coupled in musical counterpoint. For this cou-
pling of movements that, as they proceed, continually answer to one another, I 
have adopted the term correspondence (Ingold 2013: 105–8). By this I do not mean 
the endeavor to come up with some exact match or simulacrum for what we find 
in the happenings going on around us. It has nothing to do with representation or 
description. It is rather about answering to these happenings with interventions, 
questions and responses of our own—or in other words, about living attentionally 
with others. Participant observation is a practice of correspondence in this sense. 
Yet cast within the schizochronic frame of ethnography, correspondence reappears 
in the quite different guise of “intersubjectivity.” And intersubjectivity, following 
Edmund Husserl, is about living with others not attentionally but intentionally 
(Duranti 2010; Jackson 2013: 5). 
Of ethnographic intersubjectivity, we are bound to ask: is it given, as an existen-
tial condition, or is it achieved, as a communicative result? The question is unan-
swerable, since it is wrapped up in the very move by which the ethnographizing of 
encounters converts end results into initial conditions. With correspondence, how-
ever, the question does not arise. Correspondence is neither given nor achieved but 
always in the making. For one thing, it is not a relation between one subject (such 
as the anthropologist in person) and others, as the prefix inter- indicates, but one 
that carries on or unfolds along concurrent paths. And for another, in carrying on, 
persons and things are not already thrown, as the suffix –ject implies, but are in 
the throwing. They are not subjects at all, nor objects, nor are they hybrid subject-
objects. They are verbs. This is as true of humans as of beings of any other kind. 
Indeed, humans are not really beings at all but “becomings” (Ingold and Palsson 
2013). Wherever you find them, humans are humaning. That is to say, they are 
corresponding—as letter writers do, scribing their thoughts and feelings and wait-
ing for answers—living lives that weave around one another along ever-extending 
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ways. The “loose ends” that Johannes Fabian (in the themed section of this issue of 
Hau) finds in intersubjectivity are precisely the threads which are twined together 
in correspondence, and that allow life to keep going. In an interconnected world, 
where everyone and everything is already joined up and all lines lead from A to B, 
no life would be possible at all.
To practice participant observation, then, is to join in correspondence with 
those with whom we learn or among whom we study, in a movement that goes 
forward rather than back in time. Herein lies the educational purpose, dynamic, 
and potential of anthropology. As such, it is the very opposite of ethnography, the 
descriptive or documentary aims of which impose their own finalities on these 
trajectories of learning, converting them into data-gathering exercises destined to 
yield “results,” usually in the form of research papers or monographs. And this 
brings us to the question of methods. It is, of course, as common for the word eth-
nographic to be placed before method as before fieldwork. What is usually implied 
is some form of participant observation. I have already shown that the a posteriori 
ethnographizing of participant observation undermines both the ontological com-
mitment that it enshrines and its educational purpose. Questions remain, however, 
around the notion of method. Granted that participant observation and ethnogra-
phy are entirely different, that one is a practice of correspondence and the other a 
practice of description, can either be regarded as a method at all? 
A way of working
That depends, of course, on what we mean by method. We could perhaps char-
acterize participant observation as a way of working. This was probably what C. 
Wright mills (1959: 216) had in mind, in a celebrated essay on intellectual crafts-
manship, when he insisted that there can be no distinction between the theory of 
a discipline and its method—that both were indissoluble aspects of the practice of 
a craft. If anthropology’s method, in this sense, is that of the practitioner working 
with people and materials, then its discipline lies in the observational engagement 
and perceptual attunement that allow the practitioner to follow what is going on, 
and in turn to respond to it. But this is far from what is conventionally meant by 
method in the protocols of normal science, where to implement a method is to fol-
low through a sequence of prespecified and regulated steps towards the realization 
of a determinate goal. For the steps of participant observation, like those of life it-
self, are contingent on the circumstances, and advance towards no end. They rather 
tread ways of carrying on and of being carried, of living life with others—humans 
and non-humans all—that is cognizant of the past, attuned to the conditions of the 
present and speculatively open to the possibilities of the future.
What then of ethnography, sensu stricto? Is it a method? As a craft of writing 
about the people, ethnography doubtless has its methods, much as mills intimated. 
But that it is a method, applied in the service of some greater end, is questionable. 
I would argue strongly that it is not. Ethnography, surely, has value in its own right, 
not as a means to something else. We do not have to look beyond it for justifica-
tion. What greater good is there, to which ethnography allegedly owes its existence? 
The traditionalist might answer that it is comparative anthropology. There was a 
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time when we were told to treat ethnographic studies as compendia of empirical 
data, on the diverse societies and cultures of the world, which could then be used 
to test our theoretical generalizations (Sperber 1985: 10–11). Still today we persist 
in assembling studies culled from here and there between the covers of edited vol-
umes, in the hopes that insights of a general sort might fall out. Not only, however, 
is ethnographic writing grossly devalued by its reduction to “data,” but also the 
idea that universals are anything more than abstractions of our own has long been 
shown to be fallacious. Anthropology and ethnography are indeed distinct, as I 
have indicated, but this distinction cannot be aligned to one between the general 
and the particular, or between comparative-theoretical work in the study and em-
pirical data collection in the field. Ethnography is not a prelude to anthropology, as 
fieldwork to writing up. If anything, it is the other way around. The ethnographer 
writes up; the anthropologist—a correspondent observer at large—does his or her 
thinking in the world (Ingold 2011: 241–3).
A conversation of human life
The fruits of this thinking are what we tend to call “knowledge.” Sometimes we 
speak of anthropological knowledge, sometimes of ethnographic knowledge. An 
enormous amount of ink has been spilled on the question of what this knowledge 
amounts to. There is widespread agreement, nowadays, that knowledge is not built 
from facts that are simply there, waiting to be discovered and organized in terms 
of concepts and categories, but that it rather grows and is grown in the forge of our 
relations with others. I will not rehearse the arguments in support of this view, but 
will take them as read. Knowledge, as Bob White and Kiven Strohm explain in their 
preface to the themed section in this issue of Hau, is co-produced. This is the point, 
however, at which to return to my earlier observation that in the eyes of most col-
leagues who would call themselves, interchangeably, anthropologists and ethnog-
raphers, the practice of knowledge generation or co-production that they would 
call “ethnographic” appears to stop at the walls of the academy, and not to penetrate 
within. Inside the walls, they talk endlessly about ethnography, to each other and 
to their students, and of course they write it up, but they do not do it. Thus knowl-
edge co-produced with informants is ethnographic, knowledge co-produced with 
students is not.
Now I am not suggesting that we should become ethnographers of our students 
or of our academic colleagues. We are there to work with them, not to make studies 
of them. However, I would challenge those who insist on using the word ethno-
graphic to describe the knowledge that grows from their collaborative engagements 
(or correspondence) with the people among whom they work, to explain why they 
would not consider it equally appropriate to describe knowledge that grows from 
their correspondence with colleagues and students. Is it not because, despite all 
protestations to the contrary, they remain complicit in reproducing a pernicious 
distinction between those from whom and with whom we learn, respectively inside 
and outside the academy? Surely when we seek an education from great scholars, 
it is not in order that we can spend the rest of our lives describing or representing 
their ideas, worldviews, or philosophies. It is rather to hone our perceptual, moral, 
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and intellectual faculties for the critical tasks that lie ahead. But if that is so, and if—
as I have argued—to practice anthropology is to undergo an education, as much 
within as beyond the academy, then the same must be true of correspondences 
with our “non-academic” interlocutors. Knowledge is knowledge, wherever it is 
grown, and just as our purpose in acquiring it within the academy is (or should be) 
educational rather than ethnographic, so it should be beyond the academy as well.
One example of the kind of distortion to which I allude comes from a recent 
editorial, in the journal Anthropology Today, by Catherine Besteman and Angelique 
Haugerud. Their call is for a public anthropology. Of course, as they acknowledge, 
there has never been a time when anthropology has not been public, “in the sense 
that our disciplinary forte is ethnography and we carefully probe the views of our 
research interlocutors” (Besteman and Haugerud 2013: 2). Now I would be the first 
to agree that the careful, even forensic probing of ideas is a primary desideratum of 
good scholarship. To do so in the name of ethnography, however, is precisely to neu-
tralize the challenge that critical engagement with other ways of doing and know-
ing can present to public understanding. Why? Because in the ethnographizing of 
these ways, the priority shifts from engagement to reportage, from correspondence 
to description, from the co-imagining of possible futures to the characterization of 
what is already past. It is, as it were, to look through the wrong end of the telescope. 
Instead of calling on the vision afforded by our education to illuminate and enlarge 
upon the world, the ethnographer takes his or her sightings from the world in hold-
ing up the other’s ways to scrutiny. Who would dare do such a thing to our mentors 
and peers within the academy? Beyond its walls, however, such treasonable activity 
is not just routine; we even flag it up as our disciplinary strong point!
Anthropology back to front 
That anthropology has lost its public voice, or that it is scarcely audible, is certainly 
a cause for concern. Peddlers of other wares, often with ill-conceived, populist or 
fundamentalist agendas, are only too keen to fill the vacuum. Some are even pre-
pared to fake anthropological credentials in their eagerness to feed popular preju-
dice. It is a symptom of anthropology’s retreat that it has signally failed to keep such 
miscreants in check. In their manifesto for the renewal of ethnographic theory, 
Giovanni da Col and David Graeber (2011: ix) go so far as to lament that anthro-
pology, in its current predicament, is “committing a kind of intellectual suicide.” 
But is this, as they claim, for want of original insights? Is it the turn to philoso-
phy—specifically of continental European provenance—and away from ethnogra-
phy that has set the discipline on the path of self-destruction? 
I think not. For one thing, I do not share da Col and Graeber’s pessimistic as-
sessment of recent anthropology. There has been no shortage of original insights. 
Compared with most other disciplines, anthropology constantly astonishes with 
its originality. But if there is one thing that prevents anthropological insights 
from having the wider, transformative effects that we might hope for them, it is 
the constant resort to ethnography. “Ethnographically oriented particularism,” as 
Stuart mcLean (2013: 66–7) has noted, “has become not only the default setting for 
much current anthropological research and writing, . . . but also the basis for many 
2014 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4 (1): 383–395
393 That’s enough about ethnography
arguments concerning the discipline’s continued relevance to the understanding of 
contemporary social processes.” mcLean is skeptical of this “almost ubiquitously 
shared vision of anthropology,” and so am I. For far from increasing its social rel-
evance, it seems to me that the appeal to ethnography holds anthropology hostage 
to the popular stereotype of the ethnographer, which is not without foundation, as 
one who is bound to the retrospective chronicling of lives that are always on the 
brink of disappearing.
So what is this strange hybrid of pragmatism and philosophizing that goes by 
the name of ethnographic theory? In some ways it goes back to where I began my 
anthropology, as “philosophy with the people in”: an enterprise energized by the 
tension between speculative inquiry into what life could be like and a knowledge, 
rooted in practical experience, of what life is like for people of particular times 
and places (Ingold 1992: 696). I have already shown, however, that in its ethnogra-
phization, this experience is schizochronically put behind us, even as it is lived. 
As for theory, it becomes a domain in which ethnographers, having turned away 
from their respective field sites, trade in the “insights” they have brought back. Like 
connoisseurs of exotic art, they aspire to put their treasures on display, and to ex-
tract value from their comparison or juxtaposition. In the museum of ethnographic 
theory, such concept-objects as totem, mana and šaman, originating from three 
continents of the world, rub shoulders on the shelf, awaiting the attentions of the 
virtuoso scholar, who will magic them into some kind of “disjunctive homonimity” 
(da Col and Graeber 2011: viii).
Indeed ethnography and theory resemble nothing so much as the two arcs 
of a hyperbola, which cast their beams in opposite directions, lighting up the 
surfaces, respectively, of mind and world. They are back to back, and darkness 
reigns between them. But what if each arc were to reverse its orientation, so as to 
embrace the other in an encompassing, brightly illuminated ellipse? We would 
then have neither ethnography nor theory, nor even a compound of both. What 
we would have is an undivided, interstitial field of anthropology. If ethnographic 
theory is the hyperbola, anthropology is the ellipse. For ethnography, when it 
turns, is no longer ethnography but the educational correspondences of real life. 
And theory, when it turns, is no longer theory, but an imagination nourished by 
its observational engagements with the world. The rupture between reality and 
imagination—the one annexed to fact, the other to theory—has been the source 
of much havoc in the history of consciousness. It needs to be repaired. It is surely 
the task of anthropology, before all else, to repair it. In calling a halt to the prolif-
eration of ethnography, I am not asking for more theory. my plea is for a return 
to anthropology.
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Assez avec l’ethnographie!
résumé : L’ ethnographie est devenu un terme tellement galvaudé, en anthropo-
logie et dans les disciplines liées, qu’il a perdu beaucoup de son sens. Je soutiens 
qu’attribuer une qualité « ethnographique » aux rencontres avec ceux parmi lesquels 
nous effectuons nos recherches, ou plus généralement au travail de terrain, porte 
atteinte à la fois à l’engagement ontologique et au but éducatif de l’anthropologie 
en tant que discipline, et à son principal outil de travail - à savoir l’observation 
participante. Cet usage reproduit également une distinction pernicieuse entre ceux 
parmi lesquels nous étudions et apprenons, respectivement à l’intérieur et au-delà 
du cercle académique. L’obsession anthropologique pour l’ethnographie, plus que 
toute autre chose, étouffe sa voix publique. une façon de la retrouver consisterait en 
la revalorisation de l’anthropologie comme une discipline allant de l’avant et dédiée 
à panser la rupture entre l’imagination et la vie réelle.
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